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WHEN EVIDENCE ISN’T:
TRIALS, DRUG COMPANIES AND THE FDA
Drummond Rennie, M.D., F.R.C.P., M.A.C.P.*
THE EDITOR’S PRIVILEGED VANTAGE POINT
This article is written from my viewpoint as a professor of
medicine at a large biomedical research institution, the
University of California San Francisco (UCSF). This point of
view is colored by my experience as a patient and a doctor, as
well as by a lifetime climbing in the highest mountain regions in
the world. But what has allowed me a uniquely useful
perspective is that for the past 30 years I have been deputy
editor either of the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM),
or of the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA). 1
A physician-researcher is not appointed deputy editor at the
two most prominent and largest general medical journals, both
of which are owned by medical societies, by being a wild
radical. In various ways I and my fellow medical editors are
seen as representing the establishment. So consider this.
Indirectly, the issue of money’s influence on researchers and
physicians has over the past two decades eased the departure of
several of the editors in chief of our major medical journals. My
colleagues, Jerome Kassirer and Marcia Angell, both of the
NEJM, and Richard Smith, editor of the British Medical
*

M.D., F.R.C.P., M.A.C.P. Deputy Editor, JAMA, Adj. Professor of
Medicine, the Institute for Health Policy Studies, University of California San
Francisco.
1
I emphasize that I in no way express JAMA policy, nor that of its
owners, the AMA.
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Journal, have all, the moment that they left their posts, written
books bemoaning the appalling influence of pharmaceutical
company money on the morals and practices of their
profession. 2
The editor’s daily task is to examine large amounts of
clinical research from research institutions. What has made my
position so privileged and such an excellent vantage point is that
these two general medical journals are magnets attracting the
manuscripts of the best researcher-authors. Publication in one or
the other can have an extraordinary effect on a researcher’s
career. The research doesn’t exist until published, so a scientific
manuscript is far more than simply letting one’s colleagues know
new facts. Winning the fight to get published has huge social
consequence: publication in a large general medical journal,
rather than a small specialty journal, is a much larger coin—a
huge silver dollar—in helping a clinical researcher along the toll
road to academic promotion. It represents everything to an
investigator—fame and fortune. 3 So there is hot competition,
reflected in our 5-7 percent acceptance rate, and this translates
into that mysterious and precious commodity “prestige.”
The fact that these two journals are the largest general
medical journals in the world means that specialists are eager to
try to publish their best work there, and only if they have been
rejected at the general journals, will they then turn to a specialist
journal. Journalists are well aware of the careful sieving that the
NEJM and JAMA perform, so every week the major
newspapers and media carry stories from both journals—
something our authors are keenly aware of.
We editors try to determine the validity of clinical science,
selecting and then improving the best 5 percent or so of the
steady stream of 7,000 manuscripts coming in to JAMA yearly,
2

See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY
DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT, (2004); JEROME KASSIRER, ON THE
TAKE: HOW MEDICINE’S COMPLICITY WITH BIG BUSINESS CAN ENDANGER YOUR
HEALTH (2005); Richard Smith, The Trouble With Medical Journals, ROYAL
SOCIETY OF MEDICINE PRESS (2006).
3
See D. Rennie, V. Yank & L. Emanuel, When Authorship Fails: A
Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579, 579-85 (1997).
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each describing clinical research, or reviewing what is known
about a relevant clinical subject—a disease, a drug, an operation
and so on. Publication marks the first time the work is formally
and completely out of the research institution, to be scrutinized,
and attempts made to test and replicate it. However, after
publication challenges to an article’s validity and sometimes
honesty are directed at the editors. So editors sit at the hub of
science, and those seats can become extremely hot.
Science is not set up like a bank checking system, on the
assumption that fraud will be attempted. We cannot have cops,
each presumably with a PhD, in every lab. A quicker way of
inhibiting free thought and experimentation could not be
devised. So we are forced to rely on trust. The editor, also a
scientist, is part of this web of trust.
Indeed, when there’s an allegation of, say, misconduct on
the part of one of our authors at a research university, we
editors are singularly helpless. We don’t have the time,
resources, forensic expertise, mandate or authority to
investigate, adjudicate and punish. All we can do is refer the
complaint back to the author’s institution for formal
investigation—and trust that the institution will follow through.
Thus, the whole system is built on trust.
Trust depends on there being someone accountable. This is
why Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Laureate who was president
of Rockefeller University, wrote, “Above all, the act of
publication is an inscription under oath, a testimony.” 4 That is
how I was taught science should operate and assumed it did
until, in 1977, I became deputy editor of the NEJM. I soon
learned from repeated, bitter personal experience that, when
scientists had a great deal at stake, some were prepared, in the
name of prestige, to take short cuts, falsify, fabricate,
plagiarize, bamboozle, lie, cheat, and throw away their
reputations simply to notch up more publications, advance their
careers and, of course, make more money.

4

J. Lederberg, 7 THE SCIENTIST 10, 10-14 (1993).
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I. RESEARCH MISCONDUCT
By chance, I became a medical editor just at the time when
instances of scientific “fraud” were hitting the newspapers, and
engaging academics in furious debate. Several flamboyant cases
of fabricating scientists, some from important research
institutions such as Harvard and Yale, publishing fabricated
work in my journal and in others, occurred during the decade
between 1979 and 1989. The scientific establishment professed
shock and denial in equal amounts. To an editor like myself, it
was clear that the problem was real and on-going. 5
Eventually, scientists were forced to face reality by
politicians, starting with then-Congressman Al Gore, and
considerably assisted by the benign influence of wise individuals
from the American Bar Association, whose everyday job was to
confront and deal with fraud of every sort, and who were far
less prone than my colleagues to believe that scientific degrees
bestowed such attributes as honesty. In 1989 federal regulations
were put in place that defined scientific misconduct, and set out
a framework and process whereby allegations were to be
handled and adjudicated by all research institutions. While these
regulations were modified as cases occurred during the decade
of the 1990s, handling of such cases became routine and the
frenetic atmosphere surrounding such betrayals of their
profession by scientists, and especially physician-scientists,
calmed down.
Thus, when Eric Poehlman was recently sentenced to a year
in prison because he included the results of his numerous
falsified and fabricated reports in grant applications for NIH
money, scant notice was paid by the media.6 This did not meant
not that the problem of gross fraud had gone away, but that we,
the profession and the public had learned that a certain small
5

See D. Rennie & C.K. Gunsalus, Scientific Misconduct: New
Definition, Procedures, and Office—Perhaps a New Leaf, 269 JAMA 915,
915-91 (1993).
6
H.C. Sox & D. Rennie, Research Misconduct, Retraction and
Cleansing the Medical Literature: Lessons from the Poehlman Case, 144
ANN. INTERN. MED. 609, 609-13 (2006).
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proportion of scientist/physicians will turn out to be crooks. .
No great surprise to lawyers, but apparently a revelation to
scientists.
II. BIASED REPORTING OF RESULTS: DELIBERATE OR
UNCONSCIOUS
After a year or so as an editor, it became obvious to me that
such rare cases, the chainsaw massacres of science, were not the
main problem. My eyes were first opened in 1978 at the NEJM
when we published an article describing a break-through in
developing a blood test to detect chronic paranoid
schizophrenia. 7 We were astonished, embarrassed and then
angry to be told that on the day we had published our article
another had appeared in the American Journal of Psychiatry. In
the American Journal of Psychiatry’s article the authors showed
the complete absence of this marker in chronic paranoid
schizophrenics. 8 What upset us was that two of the authors
appeared on the byline of both articles. When challenged, they
disingenuously claimed that it was not their custom to refer to
unpublished work in a publication, showing that to them
authorship of a scientific article had meaning only in so far as it
brought credit in the form of another publication. The other side
of credit, responsibility, simply did not exist.
Authors would sign our forms testifying that they there was
no substantive overlap between the manuscript they had sent us
and any other paper they had in the works, yet happily publish
almost identical articles in other journals. They would attest to a
complete absence of financial conflicts of interest, but at the
same time fail to tell us, for example, of relevant patents that
they held, or that they had appeared as paid expert witnesses on
the subject on dozens of occasions. Numerous other incidents of
7

See S.G. Potkin, H.E. Cannon, D.L. Murphy & R.J. Wyatt, Are
Paranoid Schizophrenics Biologically Different from other Schizophrenics?,
298 N. ENGL. J. MED 61, 61-66 (1978) .
8
P.A. Berger, R.A. Ginsburg, J.D. Barchas, D.L. Murphy & R.J.
Wyatt, Platelet Monoamine Oxidase in Chronic Schizophrenic Patients, 135
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 95, 95-99 (1978).
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failure to accept accountability in the race for promotion, which,
had I not been an editor, I would never have known about,
made me increasingly skeptical.
III. MONEY
For clinical science, and so for us editors, everything
changed with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. 9 This
Act allowed universities, for example, to retain intellectual
property control of their inventions made while conducting
federally funded research. The Act smoothed the process
whereby researchers working on government contracts or grants
could, with their institutions, share in the action, and profit from
their discoveries. This had the desired effect: a massive influx of
venture capital into universities, and a stimulus to researchers, a
few of whom became rich, and it probably shortened the gap
between bench and bed-side for some new drugs.
However, a predictable consequence of this huge influx of
money was to compete for the interest of the researchers.
Researchers became more secretive, less willing to share, and
the sponsorship of clinical studies became a crucial issue. 10
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, I never once was
involved in an editorial discussion about funding and conflicts of
interest. In contrast, nowadays it would be very rare at the twice
weekly JAMA manuscript selection meetings for the subject not
9

Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Act (codified as 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212; implemented by 37 C.F.R. 401(1980)).
10
See J.E. Bekelman, Y. Li & C.P. Gross, Scope and Impact of
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review,
289 JAMA 454, 454-65 (2003); J. Lexchin, L.A. Bero, B. Djulbegovic, &
O. Clark, Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1167, 1167-70 (2003); B. Als-Nielsen,
W. Chen, C. Gluud & L.L. Kjaergard, Association of Funding and
Conclusions in Randomized Drug Trials: A Reflection of Treatment Effect or
Adverse Events, 290 JAMA 921, 921-28 (2003); L.A. Bero, A. Galbraith &
D. Rennie, The Publication of Sponsored Symposiums in Medical Journals,
327 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1135, 1135-40 (1992); N.K. Choudhry, H.T. Stelfox
& A.S. Detksy, Relationships Between Authors of Clinical Practice
Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA 612, 612-17 (2002).
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to come up, our skepticism often taking this sort of form: “It
seems like a good paper. Can we believe a word of it?” Are the
authors so influenced by the money they receive from their
commercial sponsors that they either deliberately distort the
evidence, or are unconsciously biased to do so?
IV. THE EVIDENCE THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS BAD
We editors are clinical investigators, and we are used to
weighing scientific evidence. So what is the evidence that
indicates that scientific evidence is suspect?
In the 1980s, faced by the challenge of trying to make sense
of, and boil down, the massive and rapidly increasing literature
on the effect of “interventions”—of drugs, surgery and other
therapies—the science of meta-analysis was developed. Metaanalysis is a rigorous technique whereby all the literature
concerning a particular drug could, using new methods of
searching, be identified, and studied for relevance and quality.
Then, after considerable winnowing, the efficacy of the drug in
all comparable high quality trials, could be worked out. Metaanalysis began to be applied on a large scale, and as, for the
first time, rational and systematic ways to sort the wheat from
the chaff, so for the first time all sorts of problems with the
literature began to emerge.
First, it was found that companies were paying physician
scientists to publish the same results of the same trials in
different journals, under different authors’ names, with no crossreferencing. Since they were also paying scientists to publish
only the positive results, and bury the negative ones, this
systematic obfuscation had the effect of creating artificial
scientific support for a drug, both before regulatory agencies,
and, of course, to impress the prescribing physician.11
11

See, e.g., P.C. Gøtzsche, Multiple Publication of Reports of Drug
Trials, 36 EUR. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 429, 429-32 (1989). See also P.
Huston & D. Moher, Redundancy, Disaggregation, and the Integrity of
Medical Research, 347 LANCET 1024, 1024-26 (1996); M.R. Tramer,
D.J.M. Reynolds, R.A. Moore & H.J. McQuay, Impact of Covert Duplicate
Publication on Meta-Analysis: A Case Study, 315 BMJ 635, 635-40 (1997).
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It was then found that some physician had so far forgotten
their professional ethics that, again at the behest of their
sponsors, they were getting the results their sponsors wanted in
drug trials by hobbling the other horse in the race, the
competitor’s drug, which in the trials was administered in the
wrong dose by the wrong route. 12
Meanwhile, it became apparent that many trials, though
ostensibly coming from impartial and prestigious research
universities, were actually set up, designed, conducted, and the
data analyzed by the companies themselves, or their dependent
subcontractors who wrote the reports of the trials. 13 These were
the manuscripts that we editors received in good faith, only to
discover, sometimes years later, that the “authors” had been
anointed as such when everything but the final draft of the
manuscript had been completed by the company, their sole
function being to lend their scientific and institutional prestige to
the trials, and make them credible to the profession. 14
Ethical investigators, outraged by what was happening,
began sending me letters that they had received from firms
acting for drug manufacturers offering them tens of thousands of
dollars simply to add their own names to reviews of a drug’s
efficacy—reviews they had never seen before and which were
always favorable to the new drug 15 . Meanwhile sponsoring
companies threatened the researchers to prevent them from
12

H.K. Johansen & P.C. Gøtzsche, Problems in the Design and
Reporting of Trials of Antifungal Agents Encountered During Meta-Analysis,
282 JAMA 1752, 1752-59 (1999); D. Rennie, Fair Conduct and Fair
Reporting of Clinical Trials, 282 JAMA 1766, 1766-68 (1999).
13
See R. Winslow, Drug Company’s PR Firm Made Offer to Pay for
Editorial, Professor Says, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1994, at B-12; D. Rennie &
A. Flanagin, Authorship! Authorship! Guests, Ghosts, Grafters, and the TwoSided Coin, 271 JAMA 469, 469-71 (1994); T. Hornbein, L. Bero & D.
Rennie, The Publication of Commercially Supported Supplements Statement,
81 ANESTH. ANALG. 887, 887-88 (1995).
14
See L.A. Bero & D. Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published
Drug Studies, 12 INT. J. TECHNOL. ASSESS. HEALTH CARE 209, 209-37
(1996).
15
T. Brennan, Buying Editorials, 331 N. ENGL. J. MED. 673, 675
(1994).
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publishing unfavorable results. 16
Soon scientists began to investigate the phenomenon. In
every one of the many scores of such studies of published trials,
an overwhelming bias was found in favor of the sponsors’
drugs, a bias that was not present when the trials were
performed by investigators free of commercial funding.
When my colleagues and I recently studied reviews drugs
used in a widespread, serious and treatable condition,
hypertension, we found that, on the basis of the same data, the
reviews sponsored by manufacturers placed a far more positive
spin on the data than did independent reviews. 17 Recently, the
situation reached its worst when some scientists published a
paper that showed that in numerous head-to-head comparisons,
drug A was better than drug B; drug B better than drug C; and
drug C better than drug A. 18 The only factor that explained this
was the funding of the various trials.
V. THE $2,000 ASPIRIN
Just how widespread this distortion of the evidence has
become was illustrated starkly in the case of two classes of drug,
the new pain-relievers, the COX-2 inhibitors, and the psychoactive drugs used in depression, the SSRIs.
The COX-2s inhibit an enzyme associated with
inflammation, and there was reason to think that they would be
16

D. Rennie, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1243 (1997); J.O. Kahn,
D.W. Gherng, K. Mayer, H. Murray & S. Lagakos, Evaluation of HIV-1
Immunogen, An Immunologic Modifier, Administered to Patients Infected with
HIV Having 300 to 549 106/L CD4 Cell Counts, 284 JAMA 2193, 2193-02
(2000); D.G. Nathan & D.J. Weatherall, Academic Freedom in Clinical
Research, 347 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1368, 1638-71 (2002).
17
V.A. Yank, D. Rennie & L.A. Bero, Financial Ties and Concordance
Between Results and Conclusions in Meta-Analyses (forthcoming 2007 in
BMJ).
18
S. Heres, J. Davis, K. Maino, E. Jetzinger, W. Kissling & S. Leucht,
Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats Quetiapine, and
Quetiapine Beats Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head
Comparison Studies of Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 163 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 185, 185-94 (2006).
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better than aspirin and all the others pain-relievers, and, being
extremely expensive, would make billions for the manufacturers.
A key claim made by the manufacturers to persuade physicians
to prescribe these expensive new drugs was that these COX-2s
caused less inflammation and bleeding in the stomach than the
standard drugs. At the same time, since the enzyme that was
inhibited tended to decrease clotting mechanisms in blood
vessels, the makers needed to show that the COX-2s did not
increase the risk of blood clots and heart attacks.
The big trials, done at the behest of the manufacturers, that
showed these crucial findings were all published in prominent
medical journals: one in JAMA 19 two in the NEJM 20 and one in
the Annals of Internal Medicine. 21 Over the next few years, and
partly because of lawsuits, it became clear that in every case the
authors either could not take full responsibility for their trials, or
there were distortions of the evidence that seriously weakened
19

F.E. Silverstein et al., Gastrointestinal Toxicity with Celecoxib vs
Nonsteroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs for Osteoarthritis and Rheumatoid
Arthritis: The CLASS Study: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 284 JAMA
1247, 1247-55 (2000). See also J.B. Hrachovec, Reporting of 6-month vs 12month Data in a Clinical Trial of Celecoxib, 286 JAMA 2398 (2001); J.M.
Wright, T.L. Perry, K.L Bassett & G.K. Chambers, Reporting of 6-month vs
12-month Data in a Clinical Trial of Celecoxib, 286 JAMA 2398 (2001).
20
C. Bombardier et al., VIGOR Study Group: Comparison of Upper
Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with
Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343(21) N. ENGL. J. MED. 1520, 1528 (Nov. 23,
2000). See also R.S. Bresalier et al., Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on
Vioxx (APPROVe) Trial Investigators: Cardiovascular Events Associated with
Rofecoxib in a Colorectal Adenoma Chemoprevention Trial, 352 N. ENGL. J.
MED.1092, 1102 (2005), Epub Feb. 15, 2005, Erratum in 355(2) N. ENGL. J.
MED. 221 (Jul. 13, 2006); S.W. Lagakos, Time-to-Event Analyses for LongTerm Treatments: the APPROVe Trial, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 113, 117
(2006); Merck and Co Inc., News Release, Merck Corrects Description of a
Statistical Method Used in APPROVe StudyMay 30, 2006, available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/corporate/2006_0530.html
(last visited Aug. 6, 2006).
21
J.R. Lisse et al., ADVANTAGE Study Group, Gastrointestinal
Tolerability and Effectiveness of Rofecoxib Versus Naproxen in the Treatment
of Osteoarthritis: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 139(7) Ann. Intern. Med.
539, 529-46 (Oct. 7, 2003).
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the conclusions of the trials that such drugs did not cause
cardiovascular disease. 22 The stock of Merck, the makers of
Vioxx, lost $29 billion in one night when they withdrew it from
the market because of its effects on the heart. 23 I believe that,
had the results been presented in a forthright manner from the
start, Vioxx might still be on the market.
VI. PUBLICATION BIAS AND TRIAL REGISTRATION
When the selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs)
were introduced, they were thought to herald a new dawn in the
treatment of disorders of mood, including depression. The
parents of children who had been prescribed these drugs,
arguing that the SSRIs had precipitated the suicides, sued the
makers, and the discovery process revealed the existence of
unpublished trials, with far less favorable results from those that
had appeared in the medical journals, as well as instances of
suicide in children given SSRIs. It is well-known that at the time
when a child’s depression is so bad that he or she has to be
taken to see a physician, suicide is a real possibility, so there is
legitimate scientific debate on the issue of whether these drugs
increase that likelihood.
The tendency of “positive” trials to be written up, sent to
journals and published before “negative” trials, is called
“publication bias”—bias, because only one side is ever known to
physicians and their patients. It has emerged as a massive
distortion of the clinical evidence because the makers are the
biggest sponsors of trials and they rarely publish the negative

22

P. Jüni, A.W.S. Rutjes & P.A. Dieppe, Are Selective COX 2
Inhibitors Superior to Traditional Non Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drugs?,
324 BMJ 1287, 1288 (2002); D.J. Graham, Cox-2 Inhibitors, Other NSAIDs,
and Cardiovascular Risk: The Seduction of Common Sense, 296 JAMA 1653,
1656 (2006).
23
Merck and Co Inc., News Release, Merck Announces Voluntary
Worldwide Withdrawal of Vioxx, Sept. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf
(last visited Aug. 4, 2006).
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results. 24 A good preventive strategy is to register all trials at
inception, so that anyone reviewing the evidence can know about
unpublished trials, and get the results, or, if they are withheld,
draw their own conclusions. 25 Representatives of the industry
refused to agree to this in 2000, claiming that the very existence
of trials was a trade secret, a position which I, as a physician, a
researcher, and, above all, as a patient and an experimental
subject in clinical trials, regard as entirely unethical. 26
However, on June 2, 2004 Eliot Spitzer, then the attorney
general for the State of New York, recognizing that no one
knew whether or not SSRIs increased the risk of suicide, but
aware that failure to reveal the existence of trials was at the very
least unfair to the parents and patients, sued a large
manufacturer, GSK, to reveal the existence of such trials. I have
summarized the events that have followed, in brief, as part of a
settlement, the company agreed to register all trials publicly. 27
Within a few days, several other drug companies agreed to
comply and on August 26, 2004, Spitzer announced a settlement
whereby GSK committed to putting summaries of the results of
all GSK-sponsored clinical trials of drugs into a clinical trials
register, posted on the Internet and conspicuously identified on
the home page of the GSK website. 28
24

K. Dickersin, S. Chan, T.C. Chalmers, H.S. Sacks & H.J.R. Smith,
Publication Bias and Clinical Trials, 8 CONTROLLED CLIN. TRIALS 343, 353
(1987). See also P.J. Easterbrook, J.A. Berlin, R. Gopalan & D.R.
Matthews, Publication Bias in Clinical Research, 337 LANCET 867, 867-72
(1991); K. Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for
its Occurrence, 263 JAMA 1385, 1385-89 (1990); K. Dickersin, R. Scherer
& C. Lefebvre, Identifying Relevant Studies for Systematic Reviews, 309 BMJ
1286, 1286-91 (1994).
25
K. Dickersin, Why Register Clinical Trials? Revisited, 13 CONTROL
CLIN. TRIALS, 170, 177 (1992); K. Dickersin & D. Rennie, Registering
Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 516, 516-23 (2003).
26
I. Chalmers, Underreporting Research is Scientific Misconduct, 263
JAMA 1405, 1408 (1990).
27
D. Rennie, Trial Registration—A Great Idea Switches from Ignored to
Irresistible, 292 JAMA 1359, 1259-362 (2004).
28
Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Press
Release, Settlement Sets New Standard for Release of Drug Information,
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Using the blunt instrument of the law, Spitzer accomplished
in a month what I and my colleagues had failed to do over more
than two decades. Meanwhile, the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors announced that, for the journals they
represented, trials would have to be registered before they could
be considered for publication. 29 Though there have been
numerous attempts by manufacturers to subvert trial registration,
while at the same time seeming to comply, (trials are registered
as being of “an investigational drug,” for example), the system
now seems to be beginning to work reasonably well.
VII. WHERE IS THE FDA IN ALL OF THIS?
A function of the FDA is to guard the health of the public,
so it is striking to discover that the FDA was entirely absent
from the debate over trial registration, even though that bears
directly on information available to patients and their physicians.
In like manner, it is reasonable to ask why the FDA did not
correct what appeared in the journals when results were
published that directly conflicted with what the FDA knew to be
the true facts. The FDA had the facts, provided under law by
the manufacturers, since a drug’s approval is contingent on such
provision, but claimed they have no mandate actually to inform
the public.
Just as Bayh-Dole in 1980 changed the culture of clinical
research, and the relationships between sponsors, researchers
and journals, so changes in the law have affected the FDA’s
relationships. The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)
was passed in 1992, 30 and revised in 1997 and 2002. The object
of PDUFA was to speed up the approval process for drugs, and
it provided the means to do this by mandating user-fees.
Manufacturers had to pay towards the costs of the approval
Aug. 26, 2004, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/aug/
aug26a_04.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
29
Clinical Trial Registration: A Statement from the International
Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 292 JAMA 1363 (2004).
30
The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA I), Public Law 102571, Oct. 29, 1992. The Act is currently up again before the Congress.
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process. The Act was effective in cutting down the time to
approval. 31 In the process, the PDUFA changed the entire
culture at the FDA as well as its relationships with the
pharmaceutical companies and the American people. The FDA
used to have one client: the American people. The fact that the
companies it regulates pay user-fees for the service has meant
that the only clients on the FDA’s case are drug company
representatives. This is so even though the speeded up process
results in profits that vastly exceed the fees, and even though the
actual contribution of industry to the finances of the FDA is a
fraction of that provided by public monies. The FDA now
behaves as if the manufacturers are the only clients worth
serving.
A telling example of this behavior, and illustration of this
relationship, has just been described by Ross. 32 The FDA knew
that numerous severe violations (four referred for criminal
investigations) had occurred in the trial performed by the maker
of the antibiotic ketec. Indeed, the FDA’s own criminal
investigators had recommended examining the manufacturers to
determine whether there had been systematic fraud—an
examination that the FDA never followed through by doing. At
the very least, these facts put the integrity of the whole database
into question. Yet the data were, despite this, still presented to
the experts for ketec’s approval, and those experts voted for its
approval without knowing that the data were highly suspect.
Subsequently, the FDA helped to retain the drug’s approval
rating by allowing foreign data on safety to be considered
despite the known unreliability of such data.
In the case of medical devices, the FDA is even more
company-friendly. A review on a device to ease severe
depression had already become a poster child for what is wrong
with medical publishing. The academics who appeared as
authors of the definitive review on the effectiveness of a vagal
31

The Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug
Administration, Prescription Drug User Fee Act, Public Meeting, 72 Federal
Register 1743-53 (Jan. 16, 2007).
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D.B. Ross, The FDA and the Case of Ketek, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED.
1601, 1604 (2007).
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nerve stimulating (VNS) device were later all revealed to have
close financial ties with the makers, none of which were
mentioned in the article. 33 The review was actually ghost-written
by an individual employed by the makers. Finally, the first
“author” on the by-line was the editor of the journal that
published it.
The approval process for the device was handled by the
FDA in an even more extraordinary fashion, 34 the approval
being granted, as Senator Charles Grassley, ranking republican
on the Senate Finance Committee, noted:
based upon a senior manager overruling more than 20
Food and Drug Administration scientists, medical,
and safety officers, as well as managers, who
reviewed the data on VNS. The high-level official
approved the device despite a resolute conclusion by
many at the FDA that the device did not demonstrate
a reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. 35
The FDA chooses not to exercise the powers it possesses.
Given that it has the power to force a manufacturer to withdraw
a drug from the market, this timid approach is astonishing, and,
of course, directly harms patients. In addition, the FDA grants
waivers to advisory committee members with disabling conflicts
of interest since they are paid by a drug’s makers to decide
about the approval of the maker’s drugs. 36 Add to that the fact
that the FDA fails to tell the public, let alone the journals, when
the agency possesses data that show authors are distorting the
evidence; and that the FDA is complicit with companies in
33

C.B. Nemeroff et al., VNS Therapy in Treatment-Resistant
Depression: Clinical Evidence and Putative Neurobiological Mechanisms, 31
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2006, Erratum in 31 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 2329 (2006).
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M. Schuchman, Approving the Vagus-Nerve Stimulator for
Depression, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1604, 1607 (2007).
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process for the Vagus Nerve Stimulation Therapy System for treatmentresistant depression, S. 1388-1389 (Feb. 16, 2006).
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2000.

RENNIE MACRO.DOC

1006

7/1/2007 10:46 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

hiding trials and so in worsening publication bias. All in all, the
FDA presents a classic picture of an agency captured by those it
regulates. 37 The failure of a politically spineless FDA to regulate
is especially unfortunate at a time when editors, the profession
and the public are losing confidence in the integrity of the trials
required by the FDA and needed by the profession and public.
VIII. POST-MARKETING SURVEILLANCE
Nothing illustrates the problem with the FDA’s pro-industry,
anti-public health stance better than post-marketing surveillance
—the single most important function for any rational system for
protecting the public against the dangers of harmful drugs.
Though it has for ten years been mandatory to register trials
having to do with HIV infection and cancer (the only conditions
regarded as “life threatening”) drug companies routinely ignored
the law and were never punished by the regulators. 38 The FDA
does not enforce requirements that companies perform the postmarketing studies on which their approval is conditioned; it puts
post-marketing surveillance in the hands of those with the least
incentive to find problems—those who handled pre-marketing
approval; and the FDA has reduced surveillance to a very small
group with little standing and prestige.
IX. WHAT IS A TRIAL?
The approval process starts with evidence gleaned from
clinical trials. It might be instructive to compare the sort of
37

See generally D. Henry & J. Lexchin, The Pharmaceutical Industry as
a Medicines Provider, 360 LANCET 1590, 1595 (2002); J. Collier & I.
Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360 LANCET 1404,
1409 (2002). See also J. Abraham, The Pharmaceutical Industry as a
Political Player, 360 LANCET 1498, 1498-502 (2002); M. Angell, Taking
Back the FDA, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2007; R. Moynihan, Alosetron: A
Case Study in Regulatory Capture, or a Victory for Patients’ Rights?, 325
BMJ 592, 592-95 (2002).
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Accessibility, 325 BMJ 528, 531 (2002).
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trials with which clinical researchers are familiar with those that
go on in the courts. It seems to me fundamental that the legal
trial carries credibility and retains force and respect with the
public because the various parties, judge, jury, opposing
counsels, witnesses and police, are independent one from
another.
A clinical trial can be different. In that process, it is very
much in the interest of the drug’s sponsor, or manufacturer, to
make everyone in the process its dependent, fostering as many
conflicts of interest as possible. Before the approval process, the
sponsor sets up the clinical trial—the drug selected, and the dose
and route of administration of the comparison drug (or placebo).
Since the trial is designed to have one outcome, is it surprising
that the comparison drug may be hobbled—given in the wrong
dose, by the wrong method? The sponsor pays those who collect
the evidence, doctors, and nurses, so is it surprising that in a
dozen ways they influence results? All the results flow in to the
sponsor, who analyses the evidence, drops what is inconvenient,
and keeps it all secret—even from the trial physicians. 39 The
manufacturer deals out to the FDA bits of evidence, and pays
the FDA (the judge) to keep it secret. Panels (the jury), usually
paid consultant fees by the sponsors, decide on FDA approval,
often lobbied for by paid grass-roots patients organizations who
pack the court (that trick is called “astro-turfing”). If the trial,
under these conditions, shows the drug works, the sponsors pay
subcontractors to write up the research and impart whatever spin
they may; they pay “distinguished” academics to add their
names as “authors” to give the enterprise credibility, and often
publish in journals dependent on the sponsors for their existence.
If the drug seems no good or harmful, the trial is buried and
everyone reminded of their confidentiality agreements. Unless
the trial is set up in this way, the sponsor will refuse to back the
trial, but even if it is set up as they wish, those same sponsors
may suddenly walk away from it, leaving patients and their
39

A.W. Chan, A. Hrobjartsson, M.T. Haahr, P.C. Gøtzsche &
D.G.Altman, Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in
Randomized Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291
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physicians high and dry. 40
In short, we have a system where defendant, developers of
evidence, police, judge, jury, and even court reporters are all
induced to arrive at one conclusion in favor of the new drug.
But no issue could possibly affect our lives and health more
than this. Moore and Cohen 41 are among many physicians who
have presented evidence about drugs that were withdrawn only
after causing many thousands of deaths. It has been estimated by
Graham that tens of thousands of Americans have died as a
consequence of taking Vioxx.
Can we really afford to continue this broken model,
pretending that patients can make informed choices when neither
their physicians, nor the editors who vetted the trial reports, can
access relevant evidence, or trust what evidence they can find?
I find none of this surprising. Drug companies behave as if
run by marketers, and nothing the pharmaceutical industry does
is more scientific than its marketing. The industry has
established, by the application of vast amounts of money, a
paradise for themselves on earth. Under the shaky (and
unaudited) pretext that it costs at least $800 million to put a new
drug on the market, 42 the industry has its way with the
Congress, researchers, the FDA, physicians and the public.

40
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(Tarcher/Putnam 2001).
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Reporting $802: Opportunity Cost of Capital as a Drug Development Cost.
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Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs,
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X. SO WHAT SHOULD BE DONE TO SALVAGE OUR FDA?
The FDA was set up to regulate drugs because of a popular
belief that the safety and effectiveness of drugs was too
important to be left to those who sold those drugs. Over the past
two decades, we have seen steady erosion in the FDA’s power
and a transfer of that power to the drug companies. More
importantly, together with increasing politicization of the
agency, there has been conspicuous erosion in the FDA’s
willingness to exercise what powers it does possess to force
compliance by the drug manufacturers with the law.
1. We should reaffirm our decision that we want drug
regulation, and the first essential is to give the FDA strong,
stable leadership. The lengthy succession of short-term acting
commissioners is as much an insult to the American people as is
the fact that the last such acting commissioner has recently pled
guilty to a criminal indictment concerning financial conflicts of
interest. Given that the pervasiveness of such conflicts has
become the principal problem with the whole system, this is
particularly shameful and emphasizes that strong ethical
leadership is essential.
The first order of business for the new commissioner should
be to restore morale, and ensure that the agency enforces the
law.
2. User fees must end. They are profoundly corrupting and
tilt the balance strongly for the manufacturers and against the
public health. It is ludicrous to imagine that the FDA could truly
work for the public if they continue to be paid not to.
3. Post-marketing surveillance. The Institute of Medicine and
a good many individuals have drawn attention to the woeful state
of post marketing surveillance. 43 I shall not repeat all their
43

Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Assessment of the US Drug
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points, but concentrate on those that I have been pushing for
several years.
First, at least as many resources must be devoted to
surveillance as to pre-marketing approval. Second, surveillance
must be given a separate department, of equal status to the
approval arm of the FDA, and taken out of the hands of the
same people who approved the drug, all of whom have a built-in
conflict in finding problems with a drug they have just
approved. Third, at present, our surveillance systems identify
perhaps 1 percent of such harms due to drugs. I believe that all
drugs must be approved for a specific probationary period, say
two years, and during that time, every patient taking the new
drugs must be entered into a database so that for the very first
time we begin to get reliable incidence rates for drug reactions
and other harms. The onus must be placed on the manufacturer
to prove that the drug should then receive full approval. Fourth,
if the post marketing studies demanded as a condition of
approval are not performed in a timely fashion, the FDA must
promptly withdraw the drug.
4. It makes no sense for the pharmaceutical companies to be
the only ones developing the evidence. At present, those who
have most to gain by finding positive results in clinical trials are
often the only source of information about their drugs. We must
separate the development of molecular entities from their later
clinical trial in humans. I am enthusiastic about venture capital
flowing to researchers and their institutions when they make new
discoveries and develop promising new therapies. I am
completely against the testing of these entities, the new drugs,
being under the control of the makers, not simply because of
failures and distortions of reporting, but because it is unethical
to treat results of experiments done on patients as trade secrets.
To deal with this fundamental problem, we must set up a
separate agency—an entirely federally-funded National Institute
of Clinical Trials, separate in budget from the NIH. This
institute would decide the trial agenda, and contract out the work
to institutions. Clinical scientists engaging in these trials would
receive all the funds through their institutions and not be allowed
to receive other funds. The results would carry great credibility
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and, because they would be trials directed to answer clinically
relevant questions, would be published fast by good journals.
Medicare and managed care organizations would see a great
advantage in having an agenda that pays more attention to the
needs of patients than to the potential profits of the
manufacturers. For the first time, they would get unbiased
results and be able to conduct credible cost-effectiveness
studies. 44 Others have proposed variants of this idea.45
Drug companies would be allowed to conduct trials of their
drugs, as at present, and to register and publish them. However,
they will find that the public is prepared to give them less
credibility and good journals will be leery of publishing them.
CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, we have come to realize that the
scientific record may be fabricated and in other ways fraudulent.
But having set up systems to deal with research misconduct, we
are now discovering a vastly more important problem: the
massive bias and distortion of the published evidence by
researchers and their sponsors, both influenced by money.
All of us will benefit from systems that remove clinical
testing from the hands of those with profound self-interest in the
results, and all will benefit from a stronger, less political, FDA,
entirely freed from pharmaceutical user-fee money.
The pharmaceutical companies, by their arrogant behavior
and their naked disregard for the well-being of the public, have
lost our trust. The FDA, by spinelessly knuckling under to every
44
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whim of the drug companies, has thrown away its high
reputation, and in so doing, also forfeited our trust. For both,
winning this trust back will be a long and painful business. But
all of us have too much at stake for them not to succeed.

